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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
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vs. 
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Defendants and Appellants, 
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LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE 
WRIGHT, his Guardian ad litem, 
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vs. 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HENRY HAYWARD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE 
WRIGHT, his Guardian ad litem, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE 
ELDREDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
7216 
Case No. 
72'17 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF T·HE CASE 
The above cases were by stipulation of the parties, 
consolidated for appeal. Both cases have previously been 
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before this court and were decided on the 5th day of Febru-
ary, 1948 and entitled Hayward vs. Downing and Wright 
vs. Downing, 189 Pac. (2nd) 442. The facts in the cases at 
bar, so far as plaintiffs' cases are concerned, are in all re-
spects the same as the facts in the cases previously decided 
by this court. In the previous trial the court granted the 
defendant's motion for a non-suit, the defendants not pre-
senting any evidence. In the cases at bar the defendants 
presented their evidence, which in certain respects contra-
dicted the evidence of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs con-
tended that they had been given permission by the defendant 
Downing to sit upon the platform in question. The defend-
dant Downing denies that he ever gave such permission and 
certain other witnesses were introduced on behalf of the 
defendants to the effect that patrons were not allowed to sit 
upon the platform and that at the time of the accident in 
question the plaintiffs and others were scuffling and 
wrestling upon the platform. The jury, in deciding the cases 
at bar, apparently was unimpressed with the denial and 
other evidence of the defendants and found the issues 
against them and in favor of plaintiffs. 
For the purpose of this appeal it is not necessary to 
elaborate upon the evidence, the plaintiff's evidence having 
been fully set ·forth in the prior appeal of this matter and 
the defendants contention being fully set forth in their 
brief in the matter now before the court. The defendants 
have assigned eight statements of errors upon which they 
rely for a reversal of the judgment entered in these cases. 
Both cases were consolidated for the purpose of trial and 
the jury made and entered its separate verdict for each of 
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the plaintiffs, making and entering a judgment in the sum 
of $3,000.00 for Lynn D. Wright, one of the plaintiffs and 
a judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 for Henry Hayward, the 
other plaintiff. It will be noted by an examination of the 
appellants brief that although they assigned eight state-
ments of errors upon which they rely for a reversal of the 
judgment entered herein, they have classified the errors 
under six divisions in their brief and the respondent's will 
confine their reply to appellant's brief in the same order 
and under the same headings as set forth in respondent's 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATELY IN-
STRUCTED ON THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK. 
It is the claim and contention of the appellants that the 
court was in error in failing to give certain of its requests, 
particularly its requests for instruction Nos. 8 (Tr. 67), 9 
(Tr. 68), 10 (Tr. 69), and 11 (Tr. 70) all of which requested 
instructions are set forth in full at pages 12 and 13 of ap-
pellant's brief. Generally assumption of risk is applied to 
cases involving the relationship of master and servant. This 
is so because ordinarily the servant knows and appreciates 
the dangers involved in his work and is as well aware of 
them as the master and having such knowledge, and if he 
does the work with full appreciation of the dangers in-
volved, he is said to have assumed the risk. It is conceivable 
that the doctrine of assumption of risk might be applied 
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to eases not involving the relationship of master and servant. 
We agree with the statement of this court in the case of 
Kuchenmeister vs. L. A. & S. L. R. R. Company, 52 Ut. 116, 
172 Pac. 725, to the effect that there is a clear distinction 
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 
An examination of the facts of that case will indicate that 
the defendant had provided the plaintiff with a reasonably 
safe place in which he could have been safely carried to his 
destination and that he of his own volition and through 
intelligent choice, left the place where he was safe and chose 
one that was extremely dangerous, being well aware of the 
dangers involved. 
This court however, merely discussed assumption of 
risk in that case but does not say that it applys to the plain-
tiff in the case, the case finally going off on another theory. 
But it will be noted from the facts that the plaintiff was 
well aware of the dangerous position he was placing himself 
in by leaving the place of safety, and had not the case in-
volved other matters the court might well have said that the 
plaintiff in that case assumed the risk. 
The case of Edwards vs. So. R. R. Company, 169 So. 
715, 106 A. L. R. 1133 (Ala.) cited by the appellants at page 
16 of their brief, states the rule of assumption of risk to be, 
"that it must be confined to cases where the plaintiff 
knew and appreciated the dangers assumed, and with 
such knowledge and appreciation voluntarily put 
himself in the way of it." 
The appellants state at page 11 of their brief in an attempt 
to bring themselves within the above quoted rule, that it can 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonably be inferred that the plaintiffs were conscious 
of the possible hazards of sitting on the platform particularly 
because some weeks before the accident the floor of the plat-
form had "bent a little." 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the plat-
form had bent some weeks before, didn't the plaintiffs have 
the right to assume that any weakened condition in the plat-
form had been remedied by the defendants, particularly 
when the defendants were continually consenting to and 
permitting the boys to sit upon the platform? There is not 
a scintilla of evidence in the entire record that the plaintiffs 
knew or appreciated any danger whatsoever in connection 
with the platform. In fact, the record 1s undisputed that the 
boys did not know that there was any danger connected with 
their sitting upon the platform. The burden was upon the 
defendants to explain how the platform collapsed. This 
they did not do. Further, the burden was upon the defend-
ants to show that the plaintiffs knew that the platform was 
dangerous at the time of the accident in question. This 
also the defendants failed to show. Certainly the plaintiffs 
after having obtained permission to sit upon the platform 
had a right to assume that it was safe. How the defendants 
can argue that the doctrine of assumption of risk is applic-
able to this case is beyond comprehension. There is absolutely 
no evidence in the record at all that the plaintiffs knew or 
appreciated the danger of the platform or that the same 
was dangerous. And if the same had been dangerous and 
the defendants knew of the dangerous condition then it 
would have been their duty to ,have warned the plaintiffs 
of the dangerous condition. The testimony quoted on Page 
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11 and 12 of the appellant's brief is the testimony appellants 
reply upon to show that the plaintiffs knew and appreciated 
the dangers involved in their sitting upon the platform. The 
testimony therein set forth is merely opinion testimony, it 
being merely the opinion of one of the defendant's witnesses, 
a mere conclusion which the witness drew from the condition 
which existed at the defendants place of business. 
It would have been gross error for the court to have 
instructed the jury on the question of assumption of risk 
when there was no testimony whatsoever upon which to 
base such an instruction. 
2. THE JURY WAS NOT ADEQUATE-LY IN-
STRUCTED ON T'HE DEFENSE OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
Under the above statement of error the defendants 
contend that the court erred in failing to give its. instruc-
tion No. 3 (Tr. 62) and in modifying its instruction No.4 
(Tr. 63) and in giving instruction No. 7 (Tr. 50) all of 
which instructions are set forth o:n page 17 and 18 of the 
appellants brief. 
Defendants request No.3 is as follows: 
"You are instructed that, if you find that the 
plaintiff by his acts or conduct other than merely 
sitting upon the platform caused, or in any manner, 
no matter how slight, contributed to the accident, he 
cannot recover and your verdict must be in favor 
of the defendants NO CAUSE OF ACTION." 
The above request of course is not a proper statement 
of the law and the defendants cannot complain of the re-
fusal of the court to give the same. 
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Suppose that the plaintiffs pursuant to the permis'sion 
given them by the defendants, were merely in the process of 
getting upon the platform and had to stand upon the same 
before they could sit down and in moving around to get in 
a position of sitting, the platform collapsed, then according 
to the above instruction plaintiffs could not recover which, 
of course is not the law. 
The court modified defendants request No. 4 in its 
instruction No. 7 by adding "and that such conduct on the 
part of plaintiff was what a reasonably prudent person would 
not have done under the facts and circumstances then and 
there existing." The defendant's question the above 
language contending at page 19 of their brief, that it per-
mits the jury to measure the plaintiffs conduct under the 
rule of conduct of that of a reasonably prudent person and 
further contending that it allows them to go beyond the per-
mission granted them. Apparently it is the defendants 
contention that the plaintiffs should not have acted as rea-
sonably prudent persons while upon the platform but should 
have acted like an unreasonably person. That is, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from defendants argument in 
this connection. The instruction as given by the court 
clearly informs the jury that if the plaintiffs scuffled or 
wrestled on the platform and didn't act like a reasonable 
person would and that such conduct in any way contributed 
to the giving away of the platform, then the plaintiffs, could 
not recover. What more could the defendants ask in this 
respect? 
It is elementary that boys of the age of the plaintiffs 
herein, to-wit, 16 years, of age, are not held to that same 
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standard of care as an adult but are only required to ex-
ercise that degree of care which boys of similiar age, ex-
perience and intelligence exercise under the same or similiar 
circumstances. The instruction as given by the court is much 
more favorable to the defendants than the law requires. 
Defendants requested instruction No. 4 (Tr. 63), set 
forth at page 18 of appellants brief, does not set forth any 
rule or standard of conduct and it would have been error for 
the trial court to have given the same without limiting it in 
someway to what a reasonably prudent person would have 
done. The plaintiffs deny that they were wrestling and 
scuffling in any manner and the jury from its verdict was 
inclined to believe them and to disbelieve the testimony 
given by defendants. 
3. THE JURY WAS NOT ADE.QUATELY IN-
STRUCTED ON THE QUESTION OF "EX-
PRESS" .CONSENT OR PERMISSION, THE 
LAW OF THE CASE. 
The defendants complain here that the court did not 
fully instruct the jury in accordance with the opinion of 
this court rendered in the prior appeal of the matter. This 
court held in the prior appeal of this matter of Hayward 
vs. Downing and Wright vs. Downing, 189 Pac. (2nd) 442, 
and at Tr. 11 herein, "Our holding is limited strictly to the 
facts of this case-where an invitee ·as to one part of the 
premises, receives permission to go upon another part of 
the premises in furtherance of the object or purpose for 
which he was originally invited upon the premises (in this 
case, to view the wrestling matches) he becomes an in-
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vitee as to such second part of the premises. As to other 
and different fact situations, we express no opinion." No-
where in the law, as expressed by this court in the prior 
appeal of this matter, is the phrase "express. consent" or 
"express permission" discussed. The court did, in discuss-
ing the facts of this case, state that one of the defendants 
had expressly consented to the plaintiffs sitting upon the 
platform, but in discussing the law of the case, the court 
merely states that where the plaintiff has permission to go 
to another part of the premises in furtherance of the object 
or purpose for which he was originally invited, that he 
then becomes an invitee as to the other part of the premises. 
Defendants, in their discussion of this matter are mak-
ing a mountain out of a mole hill. They are grasping for 
any little thing they can in hopes of aiding their futile cause. 
Plaintiff's evidence is clear that they obtained the per-
mission of the defendant Downing, to sit upon the platform 
and to there view the wrestling matches. To now argue, in 
view of that testimony, that the court meant that the jury 
must be instructed that they received "express" permission, 
is obviously an attempt upon the part of the defendants to 
read something in to the prior decision of this court. Per-
mission can only mean one thing and that is, that the plain-
tiffs were permitted or authorized to sit upon the platform 
and does not mean that the defendants directed them to sit 
there but that they acquiesced in plaintiff's request that they 
be permitted to sit upon the platform in pursuance of the 
invitation to witness the wrestling matches. The court 
continually, throughout its instructions to the jury, in-
formed the jury that the jury must find by a preponderance 
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of the evidence that the plaintiffs had permission to· sit 
upon the platform before the plaintiffs could be considered 
invitees of the defendant so far as the platform was con-
cerned. In instruction No. 2 the court used the word per-
mission once, in Instruction No.4 twice, in Instruction No. 
5, twice, once in Instruction No. 6 and twice in Instruc-
tion No.7. 
It is interesting to note that the defendants complain 
of the courts Instruction No. 7. An examination of this 
instruction (Tr. 50) and which is fully set forth at page 
20 of defendants brief, is the same as defendants request 
for Instruction No.5 (Tr. 34) and is the only request made 
by the defendants in which they requested the use of the 
phrase "express" permission. If the court had, in each 
of its instructions, stated that the plaintiffs had to have 
"express" permission it would have been error because the 
court then would have been over-emphasizing the issue of 
permission .. It is obvious from a reading of the prior opinion, 
that this court did not mean that express permission had 
to be given-whatever express permission means.-The only 
requirement that this court made in its decision was that 
the plaintiffs have permission to go to some other part of 
the premises in furtherance of the object of the invitation. 
Defendants also complain that the court erred in re-
fusing to grant their request No. 7 (Tr. 66), and fully set 
forth at page 21 of their brief. An examination of that 
request would indicate that it is contrary to the opinion 
of this court. The defendants there request the court to 
instruct the jury that before the plaintiffs can recover, they 
must show that they were directed by the defendants to sit 
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where the accident occurred. This, of course, is not the law. 
This court merely held, in its prior decision, that all that 
was necessary was permission in furtherance of the object 
of the invitation. If the plaintiffs were required to prove 
that they were directed to sit upon the platform before they 
could recover, then, of course, the plaintiffs would not be 
within the definition of "invitee" as set forth by this court 
in its prior opinion of this matter. 
4. THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE ANY EMPHA-
SIS TO THE DENIALS OF PLAINTIFFS' 
CONTENTION. 
Th~ defendants complain that the court erred in re-
fusing to give their Instruction No. 8 (Tr. 37) fully set 
forth at page 22 of their brief and complain that the court 
erred in giving its Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 49). It is the 
defendants contention that the failure to give Instruction 
No. 8 and the giving of Instruction No. 6, prejudiced them 
by not emphasizing the defendants' evidence that no per-
mission was given the plaintiffs. The matter of permission 
was discussed in Statement of Error No.3 and it is obvious 
from an examination of Instruction Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
that the court continually instructed the jury that permis-
sion from the defendants was necessary before the plaintiffs 
could recover. 
In Instruction No. 1, the court told the jury that the 
defendants deny that they had given plaintiffs permission 
to sit upon platform. In Instruction No. 6 the court, in 
effect, states that the defendants deny permission was 
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given, and further in Instruction No.7 the court instructed 
the jury that before plaintiffs can recover they must show 
that "express permission" was given. 
The defendants claim that the instructions given by 
the court do not state the legal effect of the want of per-
mission. An examination of the instructions however will 
indicate that the contention of the defendants is incorrect. 
In all of the instructions the court clearly stated to the jury 
that it was necessary for plaintiffs to have permission in 
order to recover. 
Defendants complain that the court erred in failing to 
give their requested Instruction No. 8. An examination of 
the request will show that the matters set forth in the re-
quest were fully covered in the court's Instruction No. 6. 
In the requested Instruction No. 8, the defendants wanted 
the court to instruct that if they (the jury) believed from 
the evidence that the alcove or platform was constructed 
for some other purpose than for patrons to sit or stand on 
and that plaintiffs were not given permission to sit there, 
then plaintiffs couldn't recover. 
It was not contended anywhere in the pleading nor dur-
ing the trial of the matter that the platform was constructed 
for the purpose of seating or standing patrons, but it was 
clear from the evidence that the plaintiffs did have per-
mission to sit upon the platform and to there view the 
wrestling matches and. according to this court's ruling in 
the prior decision of this matter, where plaintiffs were 
given permission to go upon another part of the premises 
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in furtherance of their invitation, then they were invitees 
as to that portion of the premises and the defendants owed 
them the duty of exercising reasonable care to see that that 
portion of the premises was in a reasonable save condition. 
The requested instruction contains three separate and 
distinct matters and the first portion of the instruction 
would have been misleading to the jury and would no doubt, 
have prejudiced the plaintiff's case if it had been given 
because, and, as stated before, there was no contention that 
the platform was constructed as a sitting place. 
The defendants further complain of the court's Instruc-
tion No. 6. An examination of that instruction (Tr. 49) 
with defendants requested Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 35) will 
indicate that the two are identical excep~ that the court 
added the words "in the exercise of ordinary care he could 
see." The defendants do not complain of the courts adding 
the above phrase. They complain of the courts having given 
Instruction No. 6, notwithstanding that they requested it. 
Instruction No. 6 covers everything that the defendants 
requested in Instruction No. 8 and says again that plaintiffs 
must have permission before they can recover. 
No where in defendants requests do they request the 
court to emphasize the fact that they deny that they gave 
permission and the defendants have not pointed out in their 
brief how the court could have more fully instructed the 
jury as to the necessity of permission and their denial of 
it than the court has already done. 
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5. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
NOT SUBMITTING THE SPECIAL INTER-
ROGATORY TO TEST THE GENERAL VER-
DICT. 
The defendants requested the court in their Instruction 
No. 12, (Tr. 71) to submit to the jury a special interrogatory 
which the defendants claim would test the general verdict as 
rendered by the jury. The defendants were frank enough 
at page 25 of their brief to quote Section 104-25-2 U. C. A. 
1943 which leaves the matter of special interrogatories to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, but, contend the de-
fendants, the failure of the trial court in the instant case 
to give their special interrogatory was prejudicial error. 
Let us exa:rpine the special interrogatory which is as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that in connection with 
your general verdict in this case, whether it be for 
the plaintiff or whether it be for the defendants, 
that you are required to answer the following ques-
tion or interrogatory: 
"Question: Did either one of the defendants tell 
the plaintiff or his companions that he, the said 
plaintiff, or his companions, might sit on the plat-
form or alcove on the night the accident occurred? 
"Answer: ............... . 
"The foregoing interrogatory shall be answered 
either yes or no, and 6 of the jurors concurring may 
make answer to the interrogatory by the foreman." 
The question which is set forth above is contrary to 
the law of this case as decided by this court in its prior 
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opinion; is contrary to the evidence and is absolutely con-
trary to the defendants contention as set forth in their brief 
on this appeal. 
In the first place, there was nothing in the evidence to 
indicate that "either one" of the defendants told the plain-
tiffs or their companions that they might sit on the plat-
form. The evidence is conclusive that the defendant Down-
ing was the only one of the defendants to give permission 
and as the court repeatedly stated in its instruction, before 
plaintiffs could recover they had to show permission and 
this matter is fully covered and particularly in Instruction 
No. 7. All through defendants brief they contend that the 
holding of this court in its prior opinion of this matter was 
that the plaintiffs must have "express permission" then in 
their special interrogatory they wanted the trial court to 
submit to the jury the question "Did either one of the de-
fendants tell the plaintiffs or his companions." The question 
would, according to defendants if it had of been submitted 
to the jury, have been contrary to this court's prior decision 
in not using the phrase "express permission." 
Instruction No. 7, and many instructions before, all 
told the jury that they must find permission before plain-
tiffs could recover. To have submitted the interrogatory as 
requested by defendants would not have added anything of 
value to the jury's verdict because the jury had to find 
permission before they could find for plaintiffs. As de-
fendants contend, the jury of course, must find that permis-
sion was given before they could return a verdict for the 
plaintiffs and this was the controlling fact in the whole case. 
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The court emphasizing over and over again that permission 
was necessary was to the plaintiff's harm and to the de-
fendant's advantage. 
6. THE SUGGESTION BY WAY OF ARGUMENT 
OF AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE WAS PRE-
JUUIGAL. 
The defendants here contend that the conduct on the 
part of one of plaintiff's attorneys in arguing "that it was 
negligence on the part of the defendants to permit the open-
ing on the wall known as the alcove, to remain there as an 
inducement for boys of the age of fourteen years or there-
abouts to sit." It is the defendant's contention that this 
argument upon the part of counsel puts before the jury 
the doctrine of "attractive nuisance." The defendants rely 
upon the case of Kerby vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company, (Idaho) 264 Pacific 377. In that case the court 
held: 
"An attorney should confine his arguments to 
the issues and the evidence adduced, and to infer-
ences which can legitimately be drawn therefrom, 
and not go outside the record in an effort to prejudice 
the rights of the opposing party." 
The remark by counsel certainly is a legitimate in-
ference that can be drawn and adduced from the evidence 
in this case. Any platform or raise above the usual seats 
which would give a person sitting there a better view of the 
wrestling matches would certainly be an inducement to a 
person to want to sit there and particularly would it be an 
inducement to younger persons. 
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As was disclosed by the evidence in this matter, the 
platform was not only an inducement to plaintiffs but was 
to persons of mature ages. 
The defendants further complain that the court should 
have instructed the jury that the matter suggested in coun-
sel's argument was not an element in the case and that the 
jury should disregard it. 
See what the court told the jury (Tr. 385) where the 
court stated to the jury that the issues in the case were set 
forth in the instructions and that the jury were the sole 
judges of the facts. What more could the court have told 
the jury? The doctrine of "attractive nuisance" was not 
involved in this case and the remark made by counsel for 
plaintiff does not raise the doctrine or attempt to bring 
the case at bar within it. It is merely a statement of an 
inference which could reasonably be drawn from the facts 
and especially in this case. There was nothing in the state-
ment made by Mr. Tanner, one of the attorneys for plain-
tiffs, that would or could in any way mislead the jury. The 
defendants rely on the case of Jensen vs. Utah Railway 
Company, 72 Ut. 366, 270 Pac. 349, in which case the court 
held that counsel are required to accept the charge as given 
by the court and yield obedience to it and are not permitted 
to argue against it. There is nothing in the argument as 
made by Mr. Tanner which is against the instructions as 
given by the court and as was held in the case of Kerby vs. 
Oregon Short Line (supra) and which the defendants rely 
upon, an attorney is allowed to argue inferences which 
legitimately can be adduced from the evidence. As was 
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stated above, the platform or alcove being high above where 
the wrestling matches took place and being a perfect place 
to view the matches, would be an inducement to anyone to 
want to sit there, and this certainly is all that was meant in 
Mr. Tanner's argument. 
We respectfully submit that the lower court did not 
err in any of the particulars as claimed by the defendants 
and that the verdict of the jury should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted 
N.H. TANNER, 
WILLARD HANSON, 
STEWART M. HANSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
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